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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CLARENCE L. JOLLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15524 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-CROSS APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. ("plaintiff") brought an 
action against Clarence L. Jolley ("defendant"), claiming 
amounts, including attorney's fees, due under three lease 
agreements dated June 24, 1971. Plaintiff also asserted 
amounts due under another agreement dated June 24, 1971, for 
the purchase of the three leased vehicles and for defendant's 
failure to make certain restricted stock free trading as 
required by the agreement. Defendant counterclaimed, assert-
ing entitlement to the three vehicles which are the subject 
of the three lease agreements. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judgment was awarded by the Third District Court 
to Petty Motor Lease, Inc. in the amount of $10,608.55, and 
defendant's counterclaim was dismissed, no cause of action. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent and cross appellant Petty Motor Lease, 
Inc. prays that the judgment be affirmed in all respects, 
except that plaintiff should be awarded its reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting its action against 
defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff does not disagree with the statement of 
facts as set forth in appellant's brief, except for appel-
lant's characterization, analysis or criticism of the evi-
dence. However, there are additional facts which are not 
stated in appellant's brief, but are set forth below. In 
addition, this statement of facts includes a summary of the 
facts upon which plaintiff relies for its claim of attor-
ney's fees. 
At trial, the three lease agreements were intro-
duced as Exhibits 1-P(A), 1-P(B) and 1-P(C). Paragraph 8 of 
the leases provides in material part as follows: 
User [defendant] agrees to pay all costs 
and expenses, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, incurred by Owner [plaintiff] 
in enforcement of its rights under this 
agreement . . 
The agreement regarding the purchase of the three 
leased vehicles and the Telegift International stock was 
introduced as Exhibit 1-P. The agreement reflects that 
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Clarence Jolley sold, assigned and transferred to Petty 
Motor Lease, Inc. 100,000 shares of stock of Telegift Inter-
national. The agreement provides: 
This stock is investment stock which 
~larence L. Jolley guarantees to have 
made free-trading stock on or before 
the expiration date of the three leases 
referred to above, under the terms and 
conditions of the Securities Act of 1933-
34, as amended. 
The expiration date of the three leases was ~une 23, 1972. 
The stock certificates (Exs. 2-P and 3-P) contain 
a restrictive legend which reads as follows: 
THESE SECURITIES MAY NOT BE SOLD, TRANS-
FERRED, PLEDGED OR HYPOTHECATED UNLESS 
THEY HAVE FIRST BEEN REGISTERED UNDER 
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 OR UNLESS 
COMPANY COUNSEL HAS GIVEN AN OPINION 
THAT REGISTRATION UNDER SAID ACT IS 
NOT REQUIRED. 
Neuman C. Petty, president of Petty Motor Lease, 
Inc., testified that in the fall of 1972, he called Clarence 
Jolley on the telephone at least twice. Specifically, Mr. 
Petty related his conversations with the defendant: 
A Well, I told him that it was his responsibility to 
get the stock freed up under the terms of our 
agreement and nothing had been done and I wanted 
him to do it or to pay the money. He said he 
would work on it and then nothing haopened and it 
was relatively the same with both conversations. 
Q How long after the first was the second conversa-
tion? 
A Oh, I don't know. 
months maybe five. 
Some months. Three or four 
I don't know exactly. 
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Q Did you have any subsequent conversation with Mr. 
Jolley? 
A Well, yes. I had another conversation a couple of 
years later, but maybe one year later with Mr. 
Jolley much to the same effect. 
Q Would you tell the court that conversation? 
A Well, I was still wanting something done to either 
collect the money or free up the stock and get it 
sold and see how that would be at the time. When 
I first called him the stock was trading actively. 
I don't know how actively but, it was quoted and I 
wanted to get it turned into money each time I 
called and that was the purpose of my call. 
(Tr.13.) 
Because of defendant's failure to free up the 
stock, Mr. Petty testified that he proceeded to make inquiry 
as to whether the stock could become free trading. Mr. 
Petty testified that he contacted counsel for Telegift 
International and Richard Bird with respect to the question 
of freeing up the stock. (Tr.14-15. l These efforts were in 
May or June of 1973, approximately one year after defendant 
was required under the terms of the agreement to make the 
stock free trading. Richard L. Bird, an attorney in Salt 
Lake City, testified that he was contacted by Neuman C. 
Petty in 1973 and that between June and September, he re-
viewed the question of freeing up the stock. No objection 
was made to Mr. Bird's testimony. 
Thomas R. Blonquist, who was corporate counsel for 
Telegift International and its successors, testified re-
garding Mr. Jolley's relationship to the corporation (Tr.36-39 
.. 
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and described the investment certificate signed by Mr. 
Jolley: 
Q Mr. Blonquist, were there any other documents in 
your files reflecting any restrictions on Mr. 
Jolley's stock? 
A I think the documents that would indicate and 
describe the restrictions from a securities stand-
point would be the proxy statement indicating his 
position by way of percentage stock ownership and 
the investment certificate that he signed wherein 
he agreed to take the stock for investment pur-
poses and to not distribute them or resell them or 
dispose of them without first complying with the 
Securities Act of 1933. 
Q Or getting an opinion from counsel of the company. 
A That is correct and this investment certificate 
specifically outlines the legend that he agreed 
could be placed upon his shares. 
Q And that is--
A On Page 2. 
Q Is that the legend that appears on the certifi-
cates 850 and 851. 
A In substance and effect that is the same thing. 
The only thing that the agreement specifically 
adds is that the parties to the transaction ac-
knowledge that the shares being issued to Mr. 
Jolley were issued pursuant to Section 4(2) (sic) 
of the Securities Act of 1933 which of course 
identified this as a private transaction as op-
posed to a no-sale rule under 133 or under Section 
4(1) (sic) or other applicable exemptions that 
could be claimed to make the shares free trading 
as opposed to investment. (Tr.40-41.) 
Mr. Blonquist also testified regarding conversa-
tions in 1973 with Neuman C. Petty, and his opinion as to 
whether the stock could be made freely tradeable without 
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registration under the Securities Act of 1933. In response 
to the question of what he told Mr. Petty, Mr. Blonquist 
testified: 
A I told him that in my view as company counsel 
there were two basic objections to any disposition 
by Mr. Jolley of the shares and that was one, that 
he was a controlling person in the corporation, 
and two, that he had signed an investment agree-
ment agreeing not to sell, hypothecate, distrib-
ute, pledge or do anything that would violate that 
investment letter and that for both of those 
reasons I felt that Mr. Jolley, unlike an uncon-
trolling stockholder, could not be in a position 
to institute proceedings either before the Commis-
sion or through any local court for relief. 
Q Now, was your opinion that, that is what you told 
him. 
A That is what I told him. 
Q Now, what is your opinion then and is it now what 
you told him at the time. 
A Yes, it is. 
Q And let me ask you this. What would be required 
to make those shares or what would be required 
before in your opinion those shares could be made 
freely trading shares. 
A Well, the only thing that I felt would do the job 
would be to register the shares with the Commis-
sion for the reasons I have mentioned those re-
strictions limiting Mr. Jolley's activities as 
they limit any officer, director or controlling 
stockholder of any publicly held company and the 
agreement specifically states that, you know, he 
can register the shares so that would be the best 
way of doing it. (Tr.43-44.) 
To this point, counsel for Mr. Jolley had not interposed any 
objection to Mr. Blonquist's testimony. Counsel for Mr. 
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Jolley objected to subsequent questions asked of Mr. Blon-
qui st. 
Defendant Clarence Jolley was asked regarding any 
requests of an opinion by company counsel: 
Q Did you ever request an opinion of company counsel 
regarding transferability or free-trading status 
of those shares? 
A I didn't. (Tr. 59-60.) 
In view of the evidence, the trial court made the 
following findings of fact: 
6. By the agreement, Exhibit 1, 
defendant agreed to make the shares re-
flected by the certificates in Telegift 
International, Inc. freely tradeable on 
or before June 23, 1972, whereupon plain-
tiff would be entitled to sell the stock 
and apply the proceeds of the sale to the 
rental due under the terms of the lease 
agreement, and the balance toward the 
purchase price of the vehicles as provided 
in the agreement. The agreement provides 
that plaintiff is entitled to the excess 
of the proceeds of such sale, or if the 
stock provided less than the amount re-
quired to pay the leases and the purchase 
price, defendant would pay the balance up 
to $10,000, plus sales tax and interest. 
7. The stock certificates each con-
tain the following legends in red type: 
"Investment stock" and "These securities 
may not be sold, transferred, pledged or 
hypothecated unless they have first been 
registered under the Securities Act of 
1933 or unless Company counsel has given 
an opinion that registration under said 
Act is not required." 
8. On March 25, 1971, defendant 
signed an investment certificate whereby 
he agreed not to sell any stock of Tele-
gift International, Inc. unless such 
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stock was registered under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 or unless company coun-
sel gave an opinion that registration 
under said Act is not required. 
9. Defendant did not register the 
100,000 shares of stock, did not receive 
an opinion from company counsel that 
registration was not required, and did 
not otherwise make the stock freely trade-
able as required by the agreement, Exhi-
bit 1. (Tr.38-39.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT TO WHICH APPEL-
LANT OBJECTS ARE CORRECT AND PROPER AND SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
This Court has reiterated many times the various 
rules of appellate review. In an action at law the Supreme 
Court does not reverse on issues of fact where the trial 
court's findings are supported by the evidence or the lack 
thereof. Martin v. Martin, 29 U.2d 413, 510 P.2d 1102; 
Branch v. Western Factors, Inc., 28 U.2d 361, 502 P.2d 570 
(1972). In Phillips Manufacturing Co. v. Putnam, 29 U.2d 
69, 504 P.2d 1376 (1973), this Court stated the rules of 
appellate review as follows: 
[T]his court does not reverse and direct 
an essential affirmative finding unless 
the evidence so compels, that is, that it 
is such that all reasonable minds acting 
fairly thereon must necessarily so find. 
Conversely, if there is a reasonable basis 
in the evidence or from the lack of evidence 
from which the court acting fairly and rea-
sonably thereon could remain unconvinced, 
its refusal to so find must be sustained. 
Moreover, in applying the tests just stated 
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to the evidence, we are obliged to view the 
evidence and reasonable inferences that can 
be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to 
the findings and judgment. (Footnotes omitted.) 
Where the evidence justifies the ruling of the trial court, 
the appellate court does not reverse the judgment unless 
there are errors involved which require reversal as a matter 
of law. Parker v. Telegift International, Inc., 29 U.2d 87, 
505 P. 2d 301 (1973). 
In Nance v. City of Provo, 29 U.2d 340, 509 P.2d 
365 (1973), this Court stated: 
Members of an appellate court do not have 
the opportunity to hear the witnesses and 
see their demeanor in court and on the wit-
ness stand and are not in as good a position 
to weigh the testimony as is the trial 
judge or jury. It is our duty on appeal 
to affirm the trial court in its findings 
of fact where there is competent evidence 
to support those findings. (Footnote omitted.) 
There was substantial evidence to support the 
findings, conclusions and judgment of the trial court. It 
was the testimony of Neuman C. Petty that on several occa-
sions he informed defendant that plaintiff was looking to 
defendant to perform his obligations under the contract. 
Defendant contradicted this testimony, but the trial court 
found in favor of plaintiff, giving the greater weight to 
the testimony of plaintiff's president. It cannot be said 
that this is not substantial evidence. 
In his brief on appeal, appellant erroneously 
refers to "weight of the evidence" and "uncorroborated 
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testimony" as elements of the test. The test on appellate 
review is a substantial evidence test; the trier of fact 
considers the weight of the evidence and the credibility of 
the witnesses. 
There is a further rule of appellate review stated 
in First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 27 U.2d 1, 
492 P.2d 132 (1971), which is applicable in this case before 
the Court. In the First Western case, this Court stated: 
In addition to and supplementing the usual 
rule of review on appeal, that we survey 
the evidence in the light favorable to the 
trial court's findings, this further com-
ment is applicable here. For the appellant's 
position is that the trial court erred in 
refusing to make certain findings essential 
to its right to recover, and insists that 
the evidence compel such findings, it is 
obliged to show that there is credible and 
uncontradicted evidence which proves those 
contended facts with such certainty that 
all reasonable minds must so find. Con-
versely, if there is any reasonable basis, 
either in the evidence or from the lack of 
evidence upon which reasonable minds might 
conclude that they are not so convinced by 
a preponderance of the evidence, then the 
finding should not be overturned. (Footnote 
omitted.) 
Defendant has not and cannot make the showing 
required by the First Western case. The best defendant can 
assert is that the evidence is controverted, which is not an 
adequate showing for reversal of the trial court's judgment. 
See Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18 U.2d 122, 417 
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P.2d 132 (1966). The cases cited above refer to uncontra-
dicted testimony and evidence so strong that all reasonable 
minds would so find as necessary to compel a court to make 
certain findings essential to a party's right to recover; 
the evidence is not uncontradicted and is not of the weight, 
in defendant's favor, that the trial court should be com-
pelled to find other than it did. 
It is not inconsistent with the trial court's 
findings, conclusions and judgment that plaintiff, when 
defendant had failed to perform, attempted to have the 
restrictions upon the stock removed and made several in-
quiries with respect to making the stock free trading. 
Certainly defendant should not have a basis to object to 
efforts on the part of plaintiff to remove the restriction 
on the stock when defendant had failed to do so. Efforts by 
a damaged party to end or mitigate his damages cannot be 
construed, without more, as inconsistent with the damaged 
party's right to require performance of the other party as 
required by the contract, and for damages for such other 
party's failure to perform. See Bjork v. April Industries, 
Inc., infra. 
Defendant is attempting to have this Court substi-
tute its findings for those of the trial court, or perhaps 
even more accurately, defendant attempts to have this Court 
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substitute the facts as defendant would have them for the 
trial court's determination of the facts. Defendant has not 
and cannot show that there was not substantial evidence to 
support the findings of the trial court and his attempt to 
substitute someone else's findings for the trial court's 
findings must fail. 
POINT II. THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW WERE AGAINST DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF ESTOPPEL 
AND WAIVER, AND SUCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Neuman C. Petty testified that he told defendant 
at least twice that plaintiff was looking to defendant to 
perform his obligations under the contract to make the stock 
free trading. Defendant's testimony was contradictory, but 
the trial court accepted testimony favorable to plaintiff, 
and that testimony constitutes substantial evidence and 
supports the trial court's findings and conclusions. 
For this Court to reverse the trial court's find-
ings, defendant must show "that there is credible and uncon-
tradicted evidence which proves those contended facts with 
such certainty that all reasonable minds must so find." 
First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Co., supra. Defen-
dant cannot show uncontradicted evidence supporting his 
claim of waiver and estoppel. 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff waived defendant's 
requirement to free up the stock within the period required 
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by the contract and that plaintiff took upon itself the 
responsibility to do so. The trial court found otherwise 
and the evidence is such that the trial court's findings, 
conclusions and judgment should be affirmed. Aopellant 
cites plaintiff's attempts to free up the stock itself as 
evidence of plaintiff's waiver of defendant's obligation to 
free the stock. The evidence suggests otherwise. First, 
there is no evidence in the record that Clarence L. Jolley 
knew of the efforts of plaintiff to free ~P the stock. 
Without such knowledge, relied upon by defendant, there 
could be no estoppel, and waiver requires the relinquishment 
of a known right. Second, plaintiff's inquiries into 
freeing up the stock were made after the date defendant's 
performance was due. That is, plaintiff made inquiry re-
garding freeing up the stock only after the date had passed 
when the defendant had guaranteed in the agreement that the 
stock would be free trading. 
These facts are similar to those in Bjork v. Anril 
Industries, Inc., 547 P.2d 219 (Utah, 1976), particularly 
with reference to waiver and plaintiff's responsibilities 
under the contract. This Court's opinion is quoted at 
length: 
The trial court found that the nlain-
tiffs were the owners of shares vali~ly and 
legally issued to them as compensation for 
services rendered, and that plaintiffs' shares 
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were the subject of the "piggyback" regis-
tration agreement which entitled plaintiffs' 
shares to registration when April made a pub-
lic offering of its shares. APril later ~ade 
a public offering but declined to register 
plaintiffs' shares. The agreement was not 
honored by April in spite of numerous inquiries 
and suggestions that it be honored. During 
the period that plaintiffs were endeavoring 
to have April honor the registration agree-
ment, the stock offered in the oublic offering 
rose in price substantially. 
Upon these facts, the trial court held 
that plaintiffs did not effectively convey 
to April their desire to sell their shares 
and should have taken steps to enforce the 
agreement and denied recovery of damages but 
ordered April to deliver shares without the 
restriction theretofore placed on the shares. 
We know of no rule of law that either 
requires or permits this result. Demand is 
not necessary where both parties have equal 
knowledge of the contract provision, or where 
the defaulting party denies the obligation. 
See 17 Am.Jur.2d 794, Contracts Sec. 356. 
Either April performed its contract (which 
it did not) or Aoril breached its contract 
(which it did) by failing to register the 
shares. Plaintiffs were entitled to damaqes 
flowing from that breach, subject only to 
the plaintiffs' obligation to mitigate those 
damages, if possible. The only possible 
manner in which damages could have been re-
duced would have been a sale of the shares 
through the use of S.E.C. Rule 144. The 
application of this rule depended upon a 
favorable opinion by April's legal counsel 
which was never offered. It is not the r~­
sponsibility of a party damaged by another's 
breach to plead with the breaching party to 
help the damaged party mitigate damages. 
The defendant's claim of waiver is ade-
quately controlled by our decision in Phoenix 
Ins. co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 ?.2d 308. 
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Waiver must be an intentional relinouishment 
of a known right. The facts here do not sup-
port a claim or finding of "intentional 
relinquishment" of the rights of the plain-
tiffs to have their shares registered at 
the time of the public offering by the defen-
dant. (Emphasis the Court's.) 
In the present case, defendant either performed 
his contract or breached the contract. The trial court 
found defendant breached the contract. The efforts of 
plaintiff to resolve the problem, to mitigate its own dam-
ages, is not a waiver of its rights under the agreement. 
See April Industries, supra. The law does not require 
plaintiff to make more demands of defendant than it did in 
this case; as stated in April Industries, supra: "Demand is 
not necessary where both parties have equal knowledge of the 
contract provision The obligation of performance 
was on defendant. 
The evidence is substantial in supporting the 
trial court's findings and against defendant's claim of 
waiver. Defendant has not and cannot meet the requirement 
of First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Co., supra. 
POINT III.THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE PROPER 
AND ANY OBJECTION THERETO WAS WAIVED BY DEFENDANT. 
Defendant made no objection to the testimony of 
Richard Bird. Further, defendant made no objection to the 
testimony of Thomas Blonquist regarding Mr. Blonquist's 
conversations with Neuman C. Petty, including the opinion 
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given to Mr. Petty that Telegift International, Inc., or its 
successor, would object to any attempt to free up the Jolley 
stock. Defendant's failure to object timely constitutes a 
waiver of any objection he might have had. In Child v. Child, 
8 U.2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958), appellant cited receipt of 
hearsay testimony as error. This Court stated: 
Whatever merit there may have been to this 
objection, the defendant is now precluded 
from voicing it. The testimony was elicited 
without objection. This constituted a waiver 
of the right to question its competency. And 
the evidence being so received could be relied 
upon as proof of the fact to which it related. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Similarly, in State in the Interest of Christensen v. 
Christensen, 227 P.2d 760 (1951), this Court stated: 
As a further ground for reversal, the 
appellant contends that the court erred 
in admitting in evidence testimony as 
to matters which were not embraced within 
the allegations of the petition for re-
hearing of the case and for modification 
of the court's order. Assuming that the 
admission of such testimony was erroneous 
because it was outside the allegations of 
the petition charging Lynn with violating 
the order of probation, the appellant can-
not complain of that error on appeal because 
he had to object to the admission of such 
testimony at the hearing. 
See Scott v. Scott, 19 U.2d 267, 430 P.2d 580 (1967). In 
Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 U.2d 
318, 392 P.2d 620 (1964), appellant alleged error for the 
trial court's refusal to separate trials for each of the 
three defendants. The record did not disclose any request 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 17 -
for separate trials nor any objection to the court's deci-
sion to try the matters in one trial. This Court held that 
it would not review a ground of objection not urged in the 
trial court. 
Defendant, not objecting to the evidence at the 
time of trial, waived any objections which he had, and those 
objections cannot be raised on appeal for the first time. 
Rule 4 of the Rules of Evidence is consistent with the 
foregoing in that it requires (1) a timely objection "so 
stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection," 
and (2) that "the admitted evidence should have been ex-
cluded on the ground stated and probably had a substantial 
influence in bringing about the verdict or finding." Defen-
dant does not meet either test since (1) there was no objec-
tion, and (2) the evidence was admissible. 
The restrictive legend on the stock required 
either an opinion of company counsel or registration of 
stock under the Securities Act of 1933. Graham Dodd, not 
being company counsel, was not qualified to testify regard-
ing freeing up of the stock. Counsel for plaintiff made 
timely objection to Mr. Dodd's testimony and the trial court 
properly refused to receive the testimony. Mr. Dodd's 
testimony was irrelevant as to freeing up the stock since he 
was not company counsel. The best he could do for defendant 
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would be to testify that the stock could be freed up; that 
would still leave defendant with the obligation of actually 
freeing up the stock by registration, opinion of company 
counsel, or a legal action. Mr. Dodd's testimony, and the 
proffer made by defendant's counsel, was irrelevant since it 
did not show, and was not intended to show, that defendant 
had performed his obligation under the contract. The issue 
is not the legal question of whether the stock could have 
been made unrestricted, but whether defendant met the re-
quirement of making the stock free trading. The testimony 
was properly refused by the trial court. 
Further, in light of what the proffered evidence 
could show, there is no basis for reversal of the trial 
court's findings and judgment. Rule 5 of the Rules of Evi-
dence precludes setting aside a finding or reversing a 
judgment because of erroneous exclusion of evidence unless 
"the excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial 
influence in bringing about a different verdict or finding." 
Again, since the issue was not whether the stock could have 
been made free trading, but whether defendant performed his 
obligation to make it free trading, the proffered evidence 
would not have brought about a different finding. 
The trial court's findings, conclusions and judg-
ment should be affirmed. 
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POINT IV. PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The three lease agreements (Exs. 1-P(A), 1-P(B) 
and 1-P(C)) provide in paragraph 8, in material part: 
"User [defendant] agrees to pay all costs 
and expenses, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, incurred by Owner [plaintiff] 
in enforcement of its rights under this 
agreement 
This is the type of contractual provision between parties 
which this Court has required, in absence of statute, for 
the award of attorney's fees. B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 
28 U.2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972); Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, 
122 Utah 80, 246 P.2d 608 (1952). 
The amount and reasonableness of the attorney's 
fees arenot disputed. Defendant's answer admitted the 
allegations of paragraph 7 of plaintiff's complaint: 
7. The lease agreements provide for 
the payment of costs and reasonable attor-
ney's fees incurred by plaintiff in the 
enforcement of its rights under the lease 
agreements. Plaintiff has been forced to 
hire counsel by defendant's actions, and 
a reasonable fee to be awarded to plaintiff 
for the use and benefit of its attorney 
herein is the sum of $2,000. 
When a party by his pleading concedes a fact, no 
proof is thereafter required for a finding upon the matter 
so confessed. Butler v. Stratton, 212 P.2d 43 (Cal.App. 
1949). No further proof was necessary, and plaintiff, by 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 20 -
virtue of the provisions of the lease agreements, was en-
titled to the attorney's fee of $2,000. 
The merger of the leases into a sales agreement 
does not preclude plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees. ~ 
the contrary, it requires the award of attorney's fees. As 
stated in National Surety Corp. v. Christiansen Brothers, I~. 
29 U.2d 460, 511 P.2d 731 (1973): 
[W]here parties engage in negotiations 
concerning a transaction, pursuant to 
which they enter into a written contract, 
it is presumed that all matters relating 
to the subject are merged in and consti-
tute a complete integration of their agree-
ment. (Footnote omitted.) 
The agreement between the parties included the three lease 
agreements and the agreement for sale of the leased vehi-
cles, which specifically referred to the three leases. The 
three leases provide for attorney's fees, and the doctrine 
of merger requires that the entire agreement be given effect. 
This requires that plaintiff be awarded its attorney's fees 
in this action. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings of fact related to 
defendant's performance or breach of the contract are sup-
ported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. 
Similarly, the trial court's findings against defendant's 
claims of estoppel or waiver are supported by substantial 
evidence and should be affirmed. 
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The trial court's evidentiary rulings were proper, 
or any objection to such rulings were waived by defendant. 
Further, there is no showing that the admitted or excluded 
evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in 
bringing about a different verdict or finding. 
Finally, the lease agreements provide for attor-
ney's fees and the amount and reasonablene?S thereof were 
admitted by defendant. Plaintiff should be awarded its 
attorney's fees in the amount of $2,000, and the trial 
court's findings, conclusions and judgment revised accord-
ingly. 
DATED this day of February, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
Wayne G. Petty 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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